Boris Pistorius has urged his compatriots to “stand up for democracy” at home and abroad, saying that costly support for Ukraine must continue
Germans should adopt a tough stance against “enemies of democracy” at home and uncomplainingly embrace the continuation of costly aid for Ukraine, Defense Minister Boris Pistorius has insisted, invoking a maxim on “happy farts.”
Speaking at a Social Democratic Party (SPD) convention in the city of Koblenz on Saturday, Pistorius branded the opposition right-wing Alternative for Germany party (AfD), and anyone voting for it, the “enemies of democracy.”
The minister urged Germans to “stand up for this democracy” more forcefully.
“A happy fart never comes from a miserable ass,” Pistorius declared, quoting 16th-century German theologian Martin Luther, a key figure in the Protestant Reformation. The phrase suggests that one’s mindset ultimately shapes outcomes.
According to the minister, Germans should apply the same attitude to external affairs.
“And that’s why it’s so important that we, as the Federal Republic of Germany… stand by Ukraine, even if it costs a lot of money,” Pistorius said.
He argued that Germany could afford the effort as the largest economy in Europe and the third largest in the world.
The defense minister acknowledged that without Western aid, “Ukraine would be dead tomorrow.”
Germany is Ukraine’s top backer within the European Union, having provided more than €40 billion ($46 billion) since the escalation of the conflict between Kiev and Moscow in February 2022.
Soon after assuming office last May, Chancellor Friedrich Merz pledged to transform the German military into the “strongest conventional army in Europe,” while continuing to prop up Ukraine.
Meanwhile, Germany’s economy saw two years of recession in 2023 and 2024, and a period of near-stagnation in 2025.
Last December, the country’s central bank warned that Germany is on track to post its largest budget deficit since reunification in 1990, citing a ramp up in military expenditure and continued financial support to Ukraine.
Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov said last year that “with their current leaders, modern Germany and the rest of Europe are transforming into a Fourth Reich.”
Mercenaries behind the assault were backed by French President Emmanuel Macron and his Benin and Ivory Coast counterparts, the Sahel state’s leader has said
Niger’s transitional leader, General Abdourahamane Tchiani, has accused France and neighboring Benin and Ivory Coast of sponsoring a “cowardly attack” on the main international airport in the Sahel state’s capital early on Thursday.
Gunfire and explosions were reported near Diori Hamani International Airport around midnight before officials said the situation had been brought under control.
Some aircraft were reportedly damaged, but no serious civilian injuries were reported. Niger’s national broadcaster said a French national was among the suspects killed in the clashes and aired footage showing several bodies on the ground.
Speaking on state television after visiting Air Base 101, next to the airport in Niamey, Gen. Tchiani named French President Emmanuel Macron, Benin’s Patrice Talon, and Ivory Coast’s Alassane Ouattara as the alleged sponsors of the assault and vowed retaliation.
“We remind the sponsors of these mercenaries, notably Emmanuel Macron, Patrice Talon, and Alassane Ouattara, that we have heard them bark long enough; they should now get ready, in turn, to hear us roar,” the military leader said.
He praised Nigerien defense and security forces, and Russian troops stationed at the base, for their “swift response” in repelling the attack. Russian forces have been deployed to the camp since 2024 after Niamey terminated a decade-old defense agreement with the US and demanded the withdrawal of roughly 1,000 American troops.
France, once the dominant external power in the Sahel, has steadily lost influence amid widespread frustration over insecurity, economic stagnation, and perceptions of foreign interference. Niger’s military leaders, along with their allies in Mali and Burkina Faso, have forced French troops to withdraw from their territories, where they had been deployed to combat jihadist groups linked to Al-Qaeda and Islamic State.
The leaders of the Alliance of Sahel States have repeatedly accused Paris of failed counterinsurgency efforts and of seeking to undermine their governments by cooperating with rebel factions operating in border regions.
France, Benin, and Ivory Coast have yet to respond publicly to Tchiani’s latest accusations. Last June, Benin rejected similar claims that it was working with Western powers to harbor militants aimed at destabilizing Niger and the wider Sahel, calling the allegations “unfounded.”
The US Department of War has reportedly clashed with contractor Anthropic over the ethical limitations built into its tech
The US Department of War is locked in a dispute with artificial intelligence developer Anthropic over restrictions that would limit how the military can deploy AI systems, including for autonomous weapons targeting and domestic surveillance.
The disagreement has stalled a contract worth up to $200 million, as military officials are pushing back against what they see as excessive limits imposed by the San Francisco-based company on the use of its technology, Reuters reported, citing six people familiar with the matter.
Anthropic has raised concerns that its AI tools could be used to carry out lethal operations without sufficient human oversight or to surveil Americans, sources told Reuters.
Pentagon officials, however, have argued that commercial AI systems should be deployable for military purposes regardless of a company’s internal usage policies, as long as they comply with US law.
The dispute comes amid a broader push by the Trump administration to rapidly integrate artificial intelligence across the armed forces. Earlier this month, the Department of War outlined a new strategy aimed at transforming the US military into an “AI-first” fighting force.
The Pentagon believes it must retain full control over how AI tools are employed on the battlefield and in intelligence operations, with US Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth vowing not to use models that “won’t allow you to fight wars.”
An Anthropic spokesperson said the company’s AI is “extensively used for national security missions by the US government” and that it remains in “productive discussions with the Department of War about ways to continue that work.” The Pentagon has yet to comment on the reported rift.
Anthropic CEO Dario Amodei has repeatedly warned about the dangers of unconstrained AI use, particularly in mass surveillance and fully autonomous weapons systems. In a recent essay, he argued that it should support national defense “in all ways except those which would make us more like our autocratic adversaries.”
The standoff poses risks for Anthropic, which has invested heavily in courting government and national-security clients and is preparing for a potential public offering. The company was one of several major AI developers to be awarded Pentagon contracts last year, alongside OpenAI, Google and Elon Musk’s xAI.
Donald Trump is not looking to destabilize the country, Matthew Whitaker has said
The US does not want a Libya-style collapse in Iran as it weighs possible military action against the country, Washington’s ambassador to NATO, Matthew Whitaker, has stated.
Libya remains divided and unstable more than a decade after a NATO-backed uprising toppled longtime leader Muammar Gaddafi in 2011, leaving rival administrations competing for power.
In recent weeks, Washington has dispatched what US President Donald Trump described as a “beautiful armada” to the Middle East, led by the aircraft carrier USS Abraham Lincoln, to pressure Tehran into accepting a new nuclear deal.
Whitaker told Fox News on Saturday that Trump “has been very clear on Iran, and that is that you can’t have a nuclear weapon and you need to stop killing protesters in your streets.”
The US buildup is “a show of strength, but it also is an off ramp for Iran,” which can “deescalate very easily” by agreeing to Washington’s terms, he added.
“President Trump has given them an ultimatum. Obviously, he does not want to see this spit out of control. We don’t want to destabilize a country like Iran the way Libya was by the [Barack] Obama administration when Gaddafi was taken out and there was no plan for the day after that,” the envoy explained.
Because of this, Washington will “be judicious in how we use our power” against Iran, Whitaker stressed.
Tehran maintains that its nuclear program is purely peaceful and that it has no plans to develop a bomb. The Iranian authorities also announced in mid-January that they were able to restore calm after a wave of violent protests, which they claimed had been instigated by the US and Israel with a goal of a regime change.
The head of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council, Ali Larijani, who held talks with Russian President Vladimir Putin in Moscow on Friday, said that progress was being made toward negotiations with Washington.
Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov also urged dialogue between the sides, warning that “any forceful actions can only create chaos in the region and lead to very dangerous consequences.”
Both Moscow and Abu Dhabi need a certain kind of partner, and both can fulfill that role without demanding ideological loyalty
This week, Moscow received United Arab Emirates President Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan.
The reception began with protocol that, beyond its ornamental purpose, functioned as a political instrument in its own right. The delegation was welcomed at the airport by First Deputy Prime Minister Denis Manturov, then taken by motorcade to the formalities unfolding in St. George Hall inside the Kremlin showing the Russia-UAE relationship has rhythm and structure, and it is being deliberately deepened at a moment when the international system is short on reliable rhythms and even shorter on stable structures.
This was the second trip by an Emirati delegation led by the head of state within a year, following the August 7, 2025 meeting, and Moscow made sure the continuity was visible. In the opening segment of talks, Russian President Vladimir Putin spoke warmly about the anniversary logic that diplomats favor, marking 55 years of relations, while anchoring the conversation in the narrative of expanding trade, functioning intergovernmental mechanisms, and investment ties that have moved from ambitious statements into working portfolios.
The atmosphere was shaped as much by who stood close to the action as by what was said aloud. Observers kept returning to two names, Igor Kostyukov and Kirill Dmitriev, whose presence hinted at a second track running beneath the ceremonial surface. In a political season in which the Ukraine crisis remains the main fault line in European security, the UAE has become a rare space where contacts can be hosted without theatricality, and without the immediate risk of public humiliation for one side or the other. Abu Dhabi’s role has been steadily institutionalized through humanitarian mediation and discreet facilitation, and the appearance of figures associated with security and economic coordination signaled that the Moscow meeting was about more than trade figures and investment headlines. It was also about process, about channels, about what can still be negotiated when grand bargains are impossible and when even modest understandings have to be carefully constructed one detail at a time.
This is why the Emirati contribution to the humanitarian dimension of the Ukraine conflict has grown into a strategic asset. Prisoner exchanges, the return of bodies, the logistics of contacts that most capitals cannot host without domestic political costs, all of this has given the UAE a reputation for operational credibility. For Abu Dhabi, this is a method of statecraft that turns competence into influence. For Moscow, it is one of the few remaining forms of engagement that can generate tangible outcomes while keeping political control close to the center. For Kiev, it offers a mechanism that can produce returns for families and communities, even when front lines are static and the larger political horizon looks unforgiving. In this type of landscape, the mediator’s value lies in keeping the minimum conditions for dialogue alive, and the UAE has treated this function as a long-term investment in relevance.
The bilateral agenda, however, remains essential, because economics provides the foundation that diplomacy alone cannot supply. The partnership is being anchored in investment platforms and joint ventures that create constituencies on both sides and make the relationship harder to reverse. The Russian Direct Investment Fund and the UAE’s Mubadala sovereign wealth fund have worked across dozens of projects, and this density outlives individual news cycles, creating institutional memory and developing shared professional networks. It normalizes cooperation in technology, industry, energy, and the humanitarian sphere, so that political dialogue is not forced to carry the entire weight of the relationship on its own. Even the seemingly soft indicators – tourism flows and everyday connectivity between societies – function as a subtle counterweight to geopolitical turbulence, reinforcing the sense that the partnership is becoming a lived reality rather than a purely diplomatic construct.
Over this economic foundation sits an increasing convergence in worldview, one that has become sharper since the UAE joined BRICS. This step does not mean Abu Dhabi is abandoning its Western ties, nor does it imply ideological alignment in the old 20th-century sense. It reflects something more contemporary, and in its own way, more consequential – a preference for a world in which power is distributed across multiple centers, rules are negotiated rather than imposed, and strategic autonomy is preserved through diversified partnerships. Russia has long framed the current era as an argument for a more equitable international order, and the UAE has increasingly spoken in a compatible register, not because it seeks confrontation with the West, but because it understands how quickly a single dependency can become a vulnerability. The logic is pragmatic: If the global system is moving toward fragmentation, then a rational state does not choose one door and lock the rest. It keeps multiple entrances open, and it ensures that no single corridor controls its future.
In this reading, the January 29 summit also carried a regional subtext that goes well beyond Moscow and Abu Dhabi. The UAE’s relationships in the Gulf and the Red Sea arc have become more complicated, and a sharp deterioration in Emirati ties with Saudi Arabia, against the background of competing interests and perceptions in Yemen, Sudan, and Somalia, makes diplomatic diversification a necessity rather than mere preference. Even where Abu Dhabi and Riyadh remain bound by economic interdependence and overlapping security concerns, their rivalry has acquired sharper edges in theaters where local partners, ports, corridors, and influence networks collide. In these conditions, Emirati decision-makers have every incentive to cultivate external relationships that can provide political cover, additional channels of communication, and a broader set of options at multilateral venues. Russia, as a permanent member of the UN Security Council and as a power with deep experience in regional bargaining, offers precisely the kind of geopolitical weight that can be useful when regional equations shift unexpectedly.
The UAE’s increasingly open and confident relationship with Israel adds another dimension to this calculus. Abu Dhabi’s bet on normalization has been driven by tangible interests, from technology and trade to security coordination and access to influence in Western capitals. Yet it also introduces risks that are not easily managed, especially when Gaza remains a wound that shapes regional public opinion and elite politics alike, and when the wider environment is saturated with suspicion about hidden agendas. Maintaining multiple great-power relationships helps mitigate these risks, allowing the UAE to resist being pulled into a single orbit and to present itself instead as a state capable of speaking to diverse actors without surrendering its freedom of maneuver. Such is the survival logic of a small yet ambitious power operating in a region where miscalculation carries enormous costs.
This is also why the broader Middle Eastern agenda likely occupied more space in the private segment of talks than the public readouts could ever admit. Russia and the UAE have overlapping interests in de-escalation, especially when it comes to Iran and the intensifying confrontation between Tehran on one side and the US and Israel on the other. Abu Dhabi’s strategic model depends on stability in the Gulf, on predictable trade routes, on the uninterrupted functioning of ports, airlines, finance, and the broader ecosystem that turns geography into power. A major military strike against Iran, or a spiral of escalation that makes the Gulf a battlefield rather than a corridor, would threaten the UAE’s core national project. This is why Emirati leaders have repeatedly favored de-escalation and dialogue as a hard national interest. Russia’s position intersects with this, both because Moscow has relationships in Tehran and across the Gulf, and because it benefits from presenting itself as a voice warning against a war that could drag the entire region into disorder. On this file, the alignment is not perfect, but it is meaningful, grounded in a shared understanding that a regional conflagration would produce no winners, only long-term damage.
The same pragmatic convergence appears on the Palestinian and Syrian questions. The Palestine-Israel conflict, and especially its most violent phases, is not a remote issue for the Emirates, even with formal relations with Israel in place. It remains a central emotional and political reality across the Arab world, and it shapes legitimacy, alliances, and the credibility of regional leadership. Russia, for its part, continues to frame the conflict through the language of international law and the necessity of a viable Palestinian state existing alongside Israel in security, a position Moscow uses to underline its claim to principled diplomacy in a world where principles are often applied selectively. The UAE has its own reasons to want a pathway that reduces regional anger and lowers the risk of radicalization and spillover instability. Meanwhile, on Syria, both sides have incentives to talk about reconstruction, reintegration, and the mechanics of stabilization, even if their methods and priorities are not identical. Russia remains deeply embedded in Syria’s security architecture. The UAE has pursued re-engagement and seeks influence in any eventual recovery. If Syria is to be rebuilt rather than endlessly managed as a crisis, few regional actors can bypass Russia, and Russia itself cannot turn recovery into reality without partners willing to invest, legitimize, and engage. The Moscow meeting offered an obvious venue for aligning assessments and exploring where interests overlap.
In this layered setting, the long one-on-one portion of the leaders’ dialogue becomes especially significant. Leaders do not spend hours alone unless the conversation extends beyond prepared talking points and safe phrases designed for transcript and television. The time suggests bargaining, mutual briefings, assessments of other players’ intentions, and a more candid exchange about risks and opportunities. It suggests that the UAE was not in Moscow merely to collect ceremonial assurances about trade and investment. It was there to consolidate its role as a diplomatic hinge, to reinforce the credibility of channels connected to Ukraine, and to position itself amid regional turbulence as a state with powerful relationships that can be activated when the environment becomes hostile.
The deeper truth is that this partnership is growing stronger because both sides need a certain kind of partner, and each recognizes that the other can fulfill this role without demanding ideological loyalty. The UAE seeks diversification with discipline, not a chaotic scattering of ties, but a carefully balanced portfolio of relationships that reduces exposure to any single crisis or patron. Russia seeks durable connections that soften isolation, generate economic and technological pathways, and provide platforms where Moscow can remain a participant in consequential diplomacy rather than a subject of it. Their cooperation therefore advances not through grand declarations, but through a steady accumulation of practical mechanisms, investment structures, humanitarian channels, and aligned positions on key regional risks.
In 2026, the world rewards this kind of pragmatism. It rewards states that can keep doors open even when others slam them shut, states that can separate essential cooperation from ideological theater, states that can mediate without moralizing and invest without pretending that economics is apolitical. Mohammed bin Zayed’s Moscow visit was, in that sense, a clear snapshot of an emerging pattern. Abu Dhabi and Moscow are strengthening their ties, turning them into infrastructure, and building a relationship designed to function in an era in which the international order is no longer a stable stage but a shifting terrain where only flexible, well-connected players can move with confidence.
If there was a single message written between the lines of the January 29 summit, it was this: In a world drifting toward multipolar competition, the UAE is determined to be more than a spectator, and Russia is determined to be more than a target of containment. Their partnership increasingly reflects that shared determination, tempered by realism and made operational through relentless attention to the practical.
The top diplomat has claimed her intelligence is improving thanks to extensive reading
EU foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas has said she “will be very smart” by the end of her term thanks to her reading habits.
Kallas made the remark at a press conference on Thursday after a journalist offered to give her a book on Kurdish history by Masoud Barzani, the first president of Iraq’s autonomous Kurdistan region.
“You know, my reading list is quite long,” she replied. “I am not telling you what I am reading right now but it is also about the history of different regions. So, by the end, when I finish this job, I will be very smart.”
Syrian Kurds, who served as a US proxy in the war that ultimately ousted President Bashar Assad, recently suffered a defeat from the forces of the new US-backed Türkiye-allied government seeking to reintegrate Syria.
EU’s Kaja Kallas:My reading list is quite long. I’m not telling you what I’m reading right now, but it’s also about the history of different regions. By the end, when I finish this job, I will be very smart. pic.twitter.com/fgcJp0VEhQ
Kallas, a former Estonian prime minister, has previously shared her reading interests, which include works by Margaret Thatcher, Tony Blair and Henry Kissinger, histories of intelligence operations and regional conflicts, and a biography of Ukraine’s Vladimir Zelensky.
The EU’s top diplomat has faced pushback for remarks critics said distorted history to suit her anti-Russian views. Last September, as Beijing hosted events marking the 80th anniversary of the end of World War II, Kallas said it was news to her that Russia and China see themselves as victors in the conflict. The USSR and China suffered the highest Allied casualties in defeating the Axis powers.
In November, Kallas stated: “In the last 100 years, Russia has attacked more than 19 countries, some as many as three or four times. None of these countries has ever attacked Russia.” Russian Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova called the comment a “monstrous” spin, adding: “We remember who attacked us and how many times… We remember where forces from each nation of Hitler’s clique were deployed.”
Und hier noch mal mit englischen Untertiteln – damit die Kallas, Außenbeauftragte der EU, besser versteht… Smiley! pic.twitter.com/ytPO7hqYak
— Martin Sonneborn (@MartinSonneborn) May 21, 2025
Kallas was blasted for lacking knowledge about world affairs by critics inside the EU as well. MEP Martin Sonneborn said he expected more insight about astrophysics from his pet hamster than about diplomacy from her.
Things are looking “very bad” for the Caribbean nation now that it has lost access to Venezuelan oil, the US president has said
The Cuban authorities would have to reach an agreement with Washington if they want to avoid a humanitarian crisis, US President Donald Trump has warned.
Earlier this week, Trump signed an executive order to impose tariffs on goods from any countries that sell oil to Cuba, further strengthening an embargo against the Caribbean nation which dates back to the 1960s.
The move comes after last month’s kidnapping by Washington of Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro; his country had served as Havana’s primary source of oil.
Mexico had increased oil deliveries to Cuba in recent weeks; Mexican President Claudia Sheinbaum warned on Friday that the US president’s order could “trigger a large-scale humanitarian crisis, directly affecting hospitals, food supplies, and other basic services for the Cuban people.”
When asked about Sheinbaum’s comment by journalists aboard Air Force One on Saturday, Trump said: “Well, it doesn’t have to be a humanitarian crisis. I think they probably would come to us and want to make a deal. So Cuba would be free again.”
“We have a situation that’s very bad for Cuba. They have no money. They have no oil… They lived off Venezuelan money and oil, and none of that’s coming now,” he said.
The US President has expressed confidence that the sides will work out a deal and that Washington would be “kind” to Havana.
Trump did not explain which specific concessions he wants from the Cuban government, only saying that “we have a lot of people in the US right now that would love to go back to Cuba and we’d like to work that out.”
Russian Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova accused Washington of the “economic suffocation” of Cuba on Saturday. She reiterated Moscow’s opposition to unilateral sanctions not endorsed by the UN, expressing confidence that Havana would be able to overcome its economic difficulties.
The Cuban authorities have declared an “international emergency” over Trump’s pressure campaign, which they are describing as an “extraordinary threat” originating in “the US anti-Cuban neo-fascist right wing.”
The next round of Washington-mediated peace negotiations between Moscow and Kiev are slated for next week in Abu Dhabi, the Ukrainian leader has said
The next round of US-mediated Moscow–Kiev talks is scheduled to take place on February 4 and 5 in Abu Dhabi, rather than this Sunday as previously planned, Ukraine’s Vladimir Zelensky has announced in a post on his Telegram channel. The Kremlin has yet to comment on any change of schedule.
The initial round, held on January 23-24, marked the first trilateral format since the Russia-Ukraine conflict escalated in February 2022 and was described by all sides as “very constructive.” The issue of territorial concessions, however, remained the main sticking point, as Ukraine refused to recognize Russia’s new borders.
The New York Times reported on Sunday that the reason for the rescheduling of the talks remains unclear, noting that it followed a “surprise” meeting over the weekend between Russian and US negotiators in Florida.
Neither side disclosed details of the discussions. However, US envoy Steve Witkoff later wrote on social media: “We are encouraged by this meeting that Russia is working toward securing peace in Ukraine.” Russian President Vladimir Putin’s envoy Kirill Dmitriev also called the meeting “constructive.”
While the upcoming Abu Dhabi talks have been described as trilateral, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio said earlier that both envoys Witkoff and Jared Kushner – Washington’s main negotiators in the Ukraine peace process – would not attend the next round of talks, though “there might be a US presence.”
Zelensky added in his Sunday post that “Ukraine is ready” for substantive discussions and is interested in achieving an outcome that would bring the conflict closer to an end.
Russia normally declines to publicly comment about details of sensitive negotiations, arguing that Ukraine-style “megaphone diplomacy” is counterproductive. Moscow has maintained that it would prefer to achieve its goals diplomatically but is prepared to do so militarily if talks fail.
Moscow insists any settlement must include Ukraine’s withdrawal from the Donbass regions of Donetsk and Lugansk that voted to join Russia in 2022 referendums and recognition of the country’s new borders, including Crimea. Kiev has rejected these demands and insisted on regaining the territories, despite continuously losing ground to Russian forces.
Member states are seeking to use the structure to bypass legal constraints on military spending, Izvestia reports
A group of NATO countries is working to set up a new bank by 2027 to help fund military spending and prepare for a potential conflict with Russia, Izvestia reports, citing sources.
Western officials and media outlets have speculated that Russia could be in a position to attack NATO within several years, with the bloc’s chief, Mark Rutte, designating the country as an “enemy.” Moscow has dismissed claims that it plans to attack NATO states as “nonsense.”
Amid the stand-off over Ukraine, European NATO members have embarked on a military buildup, with US President Donald Trump also pushing member states to take more responsibility for defense and raise spending to 5% of GDP.
Izevstia reported that the Defense, Security and Resilience Bank (DSRB) would be designed to help countries reach the 5% threshold by counting paid-in capital toward the target and by using private funding, lending, and bond mechanics. According to the paper and the DSRB website, the framework would allow some national budget limits to be sidestepped and make the defense sector more attractive for private investment.
The paper’s sources said the bank’s backers aim to finalize its charter in the first quarter of 2026, with an inaugural bond issue expected in the third or fourth quarter of 2026, and a full launch in 2027.
The report said the project would be spearheaded by British officials and aims to fundraise as much as $135 billion, with Ottawa and Toronto mulled as potential locations for the headquarters.
Another facet of the framework is that it provides an incentive for centralized procurement of standardized weapons, the article said.
The framework is also supported by banks such as ING, JPMorgan, Commerzbank, Landesbank Baden-Württemberg, and RBC Capital Markets.
Izvestia added that, given what it called NATO leaders’ “aggressive” rhetoric, the structure would likely end up “funding offense rather than defense.”
However, not all NATO members are on board with the plan. In December, the German Finance Ministry rejected the idea of creating new defense financing mechanisms, saying it would like to focus “on the rapid implementation of existing instruments.” According to Izvestia, France and several Eastern European nations are prioritizing their own frameworks.
Radoslaw Sikorski made the remarks after Defense Commissioner Andrius Kubilius called for the bloc to establish a 100,000-strong force
Polish Foreign Minister Radoslaw Sikorski has dismissed the idea of a joint EU army as “unrealistic,” after the bloc’s defense commissioner floated the idea earlier this month, citing the perceived threat from Russia and shifting US national security priorities.
The EU has repeatedly cited the ‘Russian threat’ as the pretext for a rapid military buildup. Moscow has dismissed the claims as “nonsense.”
Speaking to reporters in Brussels on Thursday, Sikorski stated that “talking about a federal army is pointless, because it’s unrealistic, because the national armies won’t merge.” He instead suggested a “European legion… which could be joined by citizens of member states, and perhaps even candidate states,” as quoted by the Polish Press Agency.
The bloc’s foreign policy and security chief, Kaja Kallas, has also expressed skepticism, saying she cannot imagine EU nations creating “a separate European army.”
Earlier this month, EU Defense Commissioner Andrius Kubilius argued that the bloc should establish a “powerful, standing European military force of 100,000 troops,” citing a shift in US strategic priorities and calls for the bloc to shoulder more of its own defense.
Ukrainian leader Vladimir Zelensky, in a controversial speech at the World Economic Forum in Davos last week, echoed the sentiment, calling for a united European army in which Kiev would play a key role.
Protocol No.7 of the Treaty of Lisbon – the last of the EU’s founding agreements – stipulates that it “does not provide for the creation of a European army or for conscription to any military formation.”
Nevertheless, discussions have intensified in recent years, particularly amid cooling US-EU relations and US President Donald Trump’s threats to forcibly seize Greenland – an autonomous territory controlled by Denmark. Several EU leaders, including French President Emmanuel Macron, have called for greater strategic autonomy.
Russia has dismissed Western claims that it plans to attack EU countries. In November, President Vladimir Putin said Russia is prepared to provide the EU and NATO with written security guarantees. According to Putin, it’s the EU that “does not have a peaceful agenda. They are on the side of war.”
