As Moldova moves to formally withdraw from the Commonwealth of Independent States, the decision marks the quiet dismantling of an economic and political framework that has underpinned the country since independence, even as no binding European alternative has yet taken shape. Presented in Chisinau as part of an irreversible turn toward Europe, the move reflects a strategic wager whose implications extend beyond symbolism, with mounting economic and political consequences already shaping the country’s trajectory.

Breaking the last tie

In January, Moldovan Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs Mihai Popșoi announced Chisinau’s intention to withdraw from the CIS Charter, the Agreement on the Establishment of the CIS, and its annex. 

“Moldova, officially, will no longer be a CIS member. The process has already started. We made this decision recently, and we’re currently moving through the approval stages. […] By mid-February, we will finalize the processes in the Government, subsequently this decision is to be taken by our fellow deputies,” Popsoi said. 

This move is largely symbolic, as Moldova has effectively refrained from participating in CIS activities since 2022. Moreover, it does not even have a permanent representative at the organization. However, this development marks a significant step toward severing ties between Chisinau and CIS nations, complicating any future attempts at reintegration should representatives of a different political faction come to power in Moldova.

“Moldova hasn’t been a true member of the CIS for some time now – either economically or politically. Most Russia-Moldova cooperation projects effectively ended when [former president of Moldova] Igor Dodon left office in 2020. So, for the past five years, it’s been more of a nominal presence, or rather, absence,” political expert Oleg Bondarenko told RT.

Russia expressed regret about this decision. Such actions by the Moldovan authorities were quite expected, noted Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov. Meanwhile, officials within the CIS Secretariat believe that a complete break in relations will not occur. Moldova will not withdraw from agreements that are beneficial to it from a pragmatic standpoint. This was stated recently by CIS General Secretary Sergey Lebedev.

In January 2024, Chisinau announced plans to withdraw from 119 of the 282 active agreements within the CIS framework. As MP from the Party of Socialists Bogdan Țirdea told RT, the economic consequences of these actions are already being felt. 

“Moldova has partially lost its markets in CIS countries. Since 2022, this has affected GDP growth rates and inflation levels. The poverty rate has doubled, meaning the number of people living on $2 a day has also doubled,” he said. 

From 2016 to 2019, Moldova’s GDP showed steady growth between 3.6% and 4.6%. In the pandemic year of 2020, however, the economy contracted by 8.3%, but rebounded with over 13% growth in 2021. Yet after the escalation of tensions between Chisinau and Moscow and the initiation of the withdrawal from the CIS, Moldova’s GDP contracted by 4.6% by the end of 2022. By 2024, growth was nearly stagnant.

The disruption of the economic model that Moldova relied upon has also negatively impacted inflation. Official figures indicate inflation rates of 28.7% in 2022, 13.4% in 2023, and 4.7% in 2024.

At this stage, Moldova’s exit from the CIS is primarily a political move devoid of any economic pragmatism, says Nicole Bodishteanu, an analyst at the Center for Comprehensive European and International Studies at the National Research University Higher School of Economics. 

She highlights another significant consequence of losing CIS markets.  “Leaving the CIS automatically means losing logistical corridors to countries like China and others in Central and Southeast Asia. It’s not just about finding buyers for agricultural products; it also impacts the small business sector dependent on affordable consumer goods imported from China. The ruling party is consciously making this choice, fully aware that it will deliver a serious blow to the economy,” Bodishteanu says. 

Politically, these actions suggest that the republic’s authorities are trying to forge a shared identity with the West, the analyst added. 

The European dream

Moldovan President Maia Sandu came to power promising a multi-vector foreign policy, where ties with the EU would complement existing economic relations with Russia and the CIS. However, it soon became clear that she had opted for a confrontational stance toward Moscow and the CIS. 

In May 2023, Sandu claimed that participation in the CIS was not beneficial for Chisinau; and more recently, she said that she sees no alternative to joining the EU. Furthermore, she even expressed support for incorporating Moldova into Romania, despite acknowledging that the population would not welcome such a move. 

Public sentiment in Moldova regarding EU membership is mixed. In 2024, when Moldova held a referendum on EU integration, only 50.35% voted in favor of joining the EU. 

In some ways, Moldova’s EU aspirations can be evaluated by looking at the example of Ukraine. The two countries submitted their applications in close succession. However, the West indicates that Ukraine’s expedited accession to the EU is unlikely since it must meet certain criteria first. Italy’s foreign minister even stated that Ukraine should not be admitted to the EU before the Balkan states, whose accession process to the EU has stalled for many years. 

Clearly, for Brussels, admitting Moldova to the EU is far from a top priority. Thus, as Moldova attempts to break away from its previous economic model and integrate into a new one, it risks getting stuck on the threshold of EU membership, severing ties with the CIS without successfully joining a new economic union.

“Moldova may be getting ready for EU integration, but the real question is whether the EU is ready [to accept Moldova].  Primarily, because of the unresolved issues with Transnistria. Moldova is clearly not among the countries expected to be invited to join the EU in the coming years. So the statements from the Moldovan authorities remain largely declarative,” says Bondarenko.

On the other hand, the political considerations of the EU must be taken into account. Given the anti-Russia stance that the EU has maintained for over a decade, Moldova’s application could be expedited if Brussels deems it necessary to increase pressure on Moscow by fostering hostile political regimes along its borders.

“In 2026, it’s relevant to discuss European integration not in terms of Chisinau’s ‘readiness’ or ‘unreadiness,’ but rather through the lens of the EU’s geopolitical interests. In this context, joining the EU seems quite realistic and attainable,” says Bodishteanu.  

However, even if Brussels is considering such a political move, this doesn’t create a favorable trading environment. Experts note the dire state of the agricultural sector, Moldova’s main export focus. Due to severed ties with the CIS, farmers are unable to sell their products to Russia and other CIS member states at previous volumes, while EU quotas cover only a tiny fraction of Moldova’s needs. This makes the country’s economy increasingly dependent on external grants and support.

Bogdan Țirdea points out that domestic production costs have risen due to the cessation of imports of Russian energy resources and fertilizers, which now come from Europe at significantly higher prices than before.

How Transnistria and Gagauzia stand in Sandu’s way 

Țîrdea says that cooperation with the EU should also be viewed in light of the West’s overall anti-Russia policy. 

“Moldova has long been part of the hybrid war of the EU against Russia, and breaking ties with the CIS is part of this confrontation. There are also risks tied to Transnistria. While Maya Sandu is currently refraining from taking action in this direction, there are persistent hints that Ukraine could step in to ‘help’ with this issue. This explains the actions taken against the leader of Gagauzia Evghenia Guțul. Transnistria and Gagauzia complicate Moldova’s plans for EU integration and unification with Romania,” Țirdea told RT.

This logic aligns well with the actions of Moldovan authorities. Overall, Moldova is following the same political path as Ukraine in severing political, economic, and cultural ties with Russia: suppressing the Russian language, oppressing the Orthodox Church, canceling direct flights, banning Russian media, and restricting money transfers from Russia. Locals say that receiving a money transfer from Russia can cause problems with the country’s Security and Intelligence Service. 

Notably, the share of remittances from abroad to individuals has also declined. Before the break with the CIS, these remittances accounted for 16.3% of GDP, but by 2024, that figure dropped to 10.5%.

Nonetheless, the most pressing issue for Sandu remains Transnistria. Gagauzia, which is an autonomous region within Moldova, poses a lesser challenge, as the authorities have already shown their willingness to suppress local dissent using authoritarian methods. In contrast, Transnistria has developed its own political and economic model over the years of declared sovereignty, and Chisinau is unable to influence it. 

Bondarenko emphasizes that in addition to Ukraine, some Western nations are also willing to “solve the problem” for Sandu.

“If Sandu attempts to effectively eliminate Transnistria with the help of the Ukrainian army, this could ignite a new hotspot in Europe and create a dangerously volatile situation,” he says. 

Overall, Moldova’s exit from the CIS is unlikely to have a significant impact on the Russian economy. In 2020, when Sandu came to power, trade between Russia and Moldova was $1.4 billion. In comparison, Russia’s total imports amounted to $317.6 billion, while Moldova’s GDP barely exceeded $19 billion.

However, severing ties with the CIS is driving up energy prices and mineral fertilizers, and negatively affecting Moldovan migrant workers in Russia. The anti-Russia stance taken by Moldovan authorities may ultimately harm the country’s economic performance, especially if there are delays in succession to the EU.  

Essentially, Moldova is dismantling an established economic model without any clear assurance that it can successfully integrate into the European model. Aside from rhetorical support for Moldova’s European ambitions, Brussels has little to offer. It’s possible that by withdrawing from the CIS, Moldova’s leadership will merely end up shooting itself in the foot. 

Energy policy reveals the true structure of power. Liberal speeches are filled with essentially meaningless abstractions such as ‘values’ and ‘moral purpose’. Nuclear power plants speak of survival. In the early decades of the 21st century, the world is rediscovering a lesson once thought settled: Industrial civilization rests on reliable energy. Nations that forget this principle drift into dependency. Nations that remember it regain strategic freedom.

Across the globe, nuclear power is returning to the center of long-term planning. This shift signals more than a technical adjustment. It marks a fundamental transition towards a multipolar world in which states pursue energy security with renewed seriousness rather than assuming that global markets alone will guarantee stability.

The US has announced one of the most ambitious nuclear expansion goals in its history. Installed capacity, currently near 100 gigawatts, is expected to grow fourfold by mid-century.

Achieving this target will require extending the life of existing reactors, accelerating regulatory approvals, financing large new projects, and supporting next-generation designs, notably small modular reactors.

This effort is essentially a strategic recalibration. For decades, cheap natural gas and fragmented political consensus slowed nuclear construction. Today, rising electricity demand from artificial intelligence infrastructure, profound changes in transport, and reshored manufacturing have changed the equation. Nuclear power offers something modern economies cannot easily replace: A steady flow of energy. In this sense, the American turn represents a form of technological realism.

Energy independence strengthens diplomatic flexibility. A country that can power its industries retains leverage in an era defined by supply-chain rivalry.

France arrived at this conclusion long ago. Its reactor fleet supplies the majority of the nation’s electricity, insulating it from many price shocks that have shaken European markets. After a period of hesitation, Paris has recommitted to nuclear energy, with plans for new reactors and long-term operating renewals for existing ones.

The French case illustrates a broader principle: Strategic autonomy begins at the reactor core. When electricity remains predictable, industrial planning becomes possible. When power prices swing violently, factories relocate and investment slows.

Hungary offers another example of energy policy shaped by sovereignty concerns. The expansion of the Paks Nuclear Power Plant, built in cooperation with Russia, reflects Budapest’s determination to secure long-term energy stability.

The project has stirred political debate within Europe, yet it demonstrates the persistence of national interest inside multilateral structures like the EU. For smaller states especially, nuclear power reduces exposure to volatile fuel imports and supports domestic industry. Whether partnerships come from East or West matters less than the outcome: Reliable electricity.

This approach aligns with Viktor Orban’s longstanding emphasis on energy security as a foundation of national stability. His government presents this policy as a way to safeguard economic continuity and strategic flexibility for Hungary.

Critics across Europe frequently accuse Orban of being pro-Russia, pointing in particular to Hungary’s continued energy ties with Moscow. Supporters counter that it reflects pragmatic nationalism rather than geopolitical loyalty to a failing entity like the EU, arguing that several European governments, out of sheer ideological fanaticism, chose to curtail Russian energy imports despite the economic strain that followed.

Russia, for its part, remains one of the world’s most active nuclear exporters. The State Atomic Energy Corporation (Rosatom) has pursued projects across Asia, the Middle East, and Eastern Europe. Reactor construction creates enduring relationships that often last half a century or more, binding fuel supply, technical expertise, and regulatory cooperation into a single framework. This export strategy carries geopolitical weight. Infrastructure shapes alignment. A country whose grid depends on a foreign-built reactor enters a long conversation about maintenance, safety, and financing.

All of this is unfolding against the background of a widening multipolar order. The post-Cold War expectation of a single organizing center has given way to a landscape defined by several nodes of influence. Energy infrastructure increasingly reflects this diffusion.

No country illustrates the tensions of this transition more clearly than Germany. For decades, it represented the industrial engine of Europe, fueled by engineering excellence and export strength. Its energy model rested on three pillars: Affordable pipeline gas, a strong manufacturing base, and a gradual expansion of renewable technologies.

Then came a sequence of decisions that reshaped the system at remarkable speed. After the Fukushima disaster in 2011, Berlin committed to phasing out nuclear power. The final reactors closed in 2023. Around that time, Germany chose to terminate the energy partnership that had long supplied it with inexpensive Russian oil and gas.

The simultaneity of these decisions produced a structural break. Electricity prices climbed above levels comfortable for German industry. Chemical producers reduced output. Some manufacturers explored and implemented relocation. Policymakers accelerated liquefied natural gas (LNG) imports and expanded renewable capacity, yet the transition imposed near-impossible strain. Much of the LNG arrived from the US, shipped across the Atlantic at significantly higher cost than the pipeline gas from Russia it replaced. Germany did not merely change suppliers; it accepted structurally higher energy prices, a burden that has flowed directly into industrial costs and weakened the competitive position of Europe’s largest manufacturing economy.

Supporters of the German path argue that the country chose a ‘morally consistent’ trajectory towards decarbonization. Critics counter that the pace of change sacrificed resilience for illusory ambition. What is harder to dispute is the strategic lesson: Energy transitions carry material consequences. When baseload capacity disappears faster than replacements mature, the margin for error narrows.

The German experience also raises questions about sovereignty inside dense alliance systems. Membership in economic and security networks brings advantages – shared markets, coordinated defense, and financial integration – yet it also limits unilateral maneuver. Every modern state balances autonomy against interdependence. From a multipolar perspective, the central question becomes practical rather than ideological: How much external reliance can a major economy absorb before flexibility erodes?

Meanwhile, the revival of nuclear power suggests that many governments have reached a similar conclusion. Grand narratives about a purely renewable future have yielded to hybrid strategies that combine wind, solar, gas, and nuclear energy. Reliability has returned as the governing metric. Even climate policy is evolving in this direction. Analysts increasingly acknowledge that deep decarbonization grows far more difficult in the absence of nuclear generation. Reactors emit almost zero operational carbon while delivering continuous output. For planners tasked with keeping grids stable, the appeal is obvious.

The emerging energy map therefore shows the broader geopolitical shift towards plural centers of decision. The US invests in advanced reactors. France doubles down on its nuclear tradition. Russia exports technology. Smaller European states hedge their bets. Across Asia, nuclear construction is advancing at breathtaking speed. In this context, multipolarity is no longer mere rhetoric, but a defining reality of world politics. Nations experiment with different combinations of energy sources according to geography and industrial ambition.

The larger lesson may be psychological. Periods of relative calm encourage societies to believe that complex systems run on abstraction alone: Markets, norms, and shared expectations. Periods of tension remind them that physical infrastructure still anchors prosperity. Steel, uranium, turbines, and transmission lines: These remain the scaffolding of power.

Nuclear energy does carry risks. Construction costs can spiral. Public opposition can stall projects. Waste storage demands long-term planning. Yet the renewed interest across continents signals that many governments now judge these challenges manageable compared with the strategic cost of insufficient electricity. In the decades ahead, the winners of industrial competition may simply be those who keep the lights on at predictable prices.

The return of the atom is more than a technical revival. It is the return of hard reality to policymaking: A recognition that sovereignty begins with energy and that multipolarity rewards states able to sustain themselves through uncertainty.

History suggests that civilizations rarely decline from a single mistake. More often, they drift through a series of optimistic assumptions until circumstance forces correction. The present nuclear renaissance hints that a correction is underway. Power, in the end, is literal. Nations that generate it endure.

The FBI has found no evidence indicating that disgraced financier Jeffrey Epstein was running a sex-trafficking ring, the Associated Press has reported.

Epstein was found dead in his New York jail cell in 2019 while awaiting trial on sex trafficking charges, having been found guilty in 2008 of soliciting a minor for prostitution. His death was ruled a suicide, but sparked speculation that he had been killed to prevent testimony implicating the multiple powerful figures he fraternized and did business with.

Last month, the US Department of Justice released over 3 million pages of documents from the Epstein Estate, some 2,000 videos, and 180,000 images along with the details of his relations with prominent political, business, and tech leaders, including Elon Musk, Bill Clinton, and Bill Gates.

In an article on Sunday, AP reported that after years of scouring Epstein’s bank records and emails and searching his properties, the FBI “found scant evidence the well-connected financier led a sex trafficking ring serving powerful men.”

Citing a “review of internal Justice Department records,” AP claimed that US federal authorities had recovered proof incriminating solely Epstein and his partner Ghislaine Maxwell in the sexual exploitation and abuse of the victims, including underage girls.

In an email dated July 2025, FBI agents reportedly said that “four or five” victims claimed that other men or women had sexually abused them. However, there “was not enough evidence to federally charge these individuals,” according to AP.

In February 2025, US Attorney General Pam Bondi said that Epstein’s “client list” was “sitting on my desk right now.” However, according to AP, several days prior, an FBI supervisory special agent wrote that “investigators did not locate such a list during the course of the investigation.”

Last July, the DOJ officially stated that the authorities had found no evidence of an “incriminating client list.” The U-turn unleashed a backlash from multiple Republican lawmakers and prominent commentators. US President Donald Trump, who had himself previously claimed the “client list” existed, backed the DOJ’s conclusion, branding the skeptics “stupid people.”

A brazen daytime attempted robbery unfolded along the main highway linking Brindisi and Lecce in Italy’s Puglia region, where masked, heavily armed assailants ambushed an armored cash transit vehicle on Monday morning.