The fourth year of the Russian military operation has come to a close. And this was the first year the Ukrainian army has primarily focused on defense, only engaging in occasional operational-tactical counterattacks. In contrast, the Russian military advanced across the entire front: the Russian Army’s five main groups of forces all executed significant operations, and four of these operations were carried out simultaneously. 

Aside from the liberation of Kursk region, claiming territories was never the only goal of Russia’s offensive operations. According to the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces, the strategy was rather aimed at exhausting the enemy’s forces – a systematic and painstaking process designed to render the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU) incapable of resistance. Combined with strategic bombardments of Ukrainian rear positions, this approach has resulted in a slow yet steady progress. 

Below, we’ll examine the five main offensive operations (categorized by the army groupings that executed them), from north to south. 

North Group of Forces: Sudzha and beyond

Ukraine launched an incursion into Russia’s Kursk region in August 2024; however, the operation quickly lost momentum. By September, the foothold began to shrink, and efforts to fortify or expand it consistently failed.

By the end of February 2025, Ukraine controlled approximately 400 square kilometers, or about 40% of the initially seized area. However, the AFU still held the town of Sudzha and the supply route leading to it from Ukraine’s Sumy region. 

Liberating Kursk region was necessary for both political and humanitarian reasons. On March 7, 2025, along with strikes on the enemy’s rear positions and the destruction of crossings set up by the AFU, the North Group of Forces launched a comprehensive offensive along the entire perimeter of the territory. On the southern flank, troops from North Korea made a deep breakthrough to the border, severing a secondary road that supplied the garrison in Sudzha after the main route from Sumy to Kursk came under constant fire.

On the morning of March 8, the now-famous operation where Russian troops crawled through a gas pipeline to infiltrate the industrial zone of Sudzha took place. 800 troops (essentially a regiment) successfully disrupted enemy logistics, and by the end of the day, the area to the north and east of the exit point was liberated from Ukrainian control.

Two days later, Sudzha was liberated; Ukrainian forces retreated chaotically, sometimes even fleeing toward the border and abandoning their equipment. By March 13, the operation was nearly complete; another 10 days were needed to clear the territory and establish final control. 

However, the fighting in this area did not cease with the liberation of Sudzha. In April and May, the Russian army established a large foothold in Ukraine’s Sumy region. The Kremlin called this area a security buffer zone. Despite the AFU’s counterattacks, the foothold steadily grew; it now stretches up to 30 kilometers along the front and is 15 kilometers wide. In recent months, a second foothold was established, effectively securing Kursk and Belgorod regions against any further ground incursions from Ukraine.

West Group of Forces: Mixed success 

The West Group of Forces operates in a ‘remote corner’ of the front that was formed after the retreat from Kharkov region in 2022. Firstly, this area is isolated from the main front by the wide and swift Seversky Donets River. Secondly, it faces significant supply challenges: there are no railroads, major highways, or settlements that can be used for supplies near it, so all supplies come from Belgorod and Voronezh regions. Actually, it is more of a foothold than a real front.

The situation could be fixed by capturing Kupiansk and its major railway line. However, this is quite challenging. Efforts to shift the front and capture the eastern part of Kupiansk, separated by the Oskol River, began as early as 2022 but were hampered by supply issues and ultimately failed.

Nonetheless, in late 2024, the Russian army managed to secure bridgeheads on the western bank of the Oskol River north of Kupiansk. This laid the groundwork for the operation: if Russian troops could seize the western portion of the city and cut off the eastern districts along with the railway station, they might take control of them with minimal resistance and destruction. This was certainly possible, since Ukrainian forces often abandoned cities in Donbass upon being encircled.  

Until October, things progressed reasonably well: advancing towards Kupiansk from the north, the Russian army pushed Ukrainian forces out of the central part of the city (i.e. the western bank) and effectively took control of it. The North Group of Forces helped by occupying a long stretch along the border and diverting the attention of some of the Ukrainian troops. 

However, the situation proved unstable: communication with the troops in the city relied on a narrow corridor in the north and several vulnerable crossings over the Oskol River. At the same time, several Ukrainian brigades remained on the eastern bank; they were weakened, but still able to fight.  

In mid-October, Ukrainian forces launched a counteroffensive in this area. They managed to penetrate deep into the northern bridgehead and threatened the supply lines of the Russian garrison in Kupiansk, forcing it to retreat from parts of the urban area. However, the Ukrainian army’s offensive potential soon dwindled: within a week or two, the fighting in western Kupiansk transitioned into a slow, positional phase. The Russian army focused on advancing toward the Kupiansk-Uzlovoy railway station and the eastern part of the city.

West and South groups of forces: Two banks, one strategy

The cities of Liman and Seversk are situated on opposite banks of the Seversky Donets River, and while different groups of forces are engaged in the fighting there, their efforts are united by a common strategy.

The Russian army withdrew from Liman during the 2022 Ukrainian offensive, at the same time as it retreated from Kupiansk. For two years, bloody positional battles were fought for control over the Serebriansky Forest, which served as the AFU’s main stronghold.

In August and September, however, Ukrainian forces had to withdraw troops from this area to focus on Kupiansk and Pokrovsk (we’ll talk more about Pokrovsk below). Within just a couple of weeks, the Serebriansky Forest fell completely under Russian control.

After that, the neighboring sections of the front fell like dominoes. By November, the roads to Liman were cut off, and by December, the city was blocked. Southwest of Liman, the West Group of Forces advanced toward the Seversky Donets River.

At the same time, the front along the southern bank of the Seversky Donets River, which had been stagnant for three years, became active. The South Group of Forces, which operated here, no longer feared threats from the flanks, from the side of the Serebriansky Forest. In October, the troops advanced towards the strategically important city of Seversk, and in December, they captured it. From the opposite side of the river, the West Group of Forces skillfully disrupted the enemy’s rear positions, making it easier to storm Seversk.

The next objective in this sector is to liberate Liman (West Group of Forces) and advance towards Slaviansk-Kramatorsk (South Group of Forces). Along with the battles for Slaviansk-Kramatorsk – the largest stronghold of the AFU in Donbass – this will become the focus of the next campaign.

South and Center Groups of Forces: The ‘core’ section of the front

Last year, the central front emerged as the most active direction. In May, the South Group of Forces captured the strategically significant city of Chasov Yar, which proved very challenging to storm. Earlier, despite counterattacks from Ukrainian forces, they had captured Toretsk (Dzerzhinsk).

The AFU’s next fortified position in this direction was Konstantinovka. Battles began in the fall after the South Group of Forces had liberated an extensive area of over 1,000 square kilometers to the south and west of the city.

As a result, Konstantinovka was surrounded on three sides. By November-December, the fighting had entered a familiar phase: Russian troops established fire control over supply lines and focused on exhausting the Ukrainian garrison, while assault groups slowly advanced through urban areas. This method has become the Russian army’s primary tool for wearing down Ukrainian forces.

In the fourth year of the military operation, the main battles were fought for the cities of Pokrovsk and Mirnograd. We had already written in detail about the course of battles for control over this area, which is the second-largest urban agglomeration still under Ukrainian control. Let’s recap briefly.

At the end of 2024, the Center Group of Forces reached the outskirts of Pokrovsk and Mirnograd, and by mid-2025, the troops formed a semicircle around the cities and began establishing fire control over supply routes. Everything proceeded steadily, and it seemed the course of combat here would be similar to other areas: several weeks or months of attrition, followed by a relatively organized retreat of the battered Ukrainian garrisons, and a slow establishment of a new front to the west.

However, this time, things were different. In July, long before Ukrainian supply lines were blocked, Russian assault groups swiftly and easily captured the southern part of Pokrovsk. This was unusual: Ukrainian garrisons tended to be quite resilient as long as they had normal logistics. Moreover, with the prevalence of drones in the air, carrying out direct assaults was very challenging. But as it later became known, there simply weren’t any enemy troops in that area, and the Center Group of Forces exploited this gap in the front.

A week later, reports emerged of a deep breakthrough by Russian forces north of the Pokrovsk-Mirnograd agglomeration, between Dobropolye and Konstantinovka. This breach, which also became possible due to the severe shortage of Ukrainian troops, was ultimately contained by Ukrainian firefighting units pulled from other sections of the front. However, it put the garrison of Mirnograd in a precarious position: viewed from the Ukrainian side, the city was situated behind Pokrovsk and the Dobropolye breakthrough.

It’s unclear whether this unexpected breakthrough forced the Russian side to revise its strategies, but thereafter, fighting shifted to the northern flank. The Center Group of Forces retreated from the most distant and vulnerable positions of the Dobropolye sector and, along with the South Group of Forces, focused on strengthening its base along the Shakhovo-Rodinskoye line.

By September, Mirnograd, along with the fields, mines, and worker settlements surrounding it, was operationally encircled, and by the end of October, it was surrounded. Much of Pokrovsk was also captured at this time.

After reallocating additional reserves from other parts of the front, the AFU attempted to break the encirclement, launching an attack north of Pokrovsk along the Rodinskoye-Mirnograd line. This was the largest counterattack undertaken by the Ukrainian army that year. However, the counterattack failed, and the fate of Pokrovsk and Mirnograd was sealed.

East Group of Forces: From east to west

The capture of Pokrovsk and Mirnograd was quite expected: in late 2024, many analysts (including us) predicted that major developments would unfold in this area.

However, when it came to territorial gains, the southern direction became paramount – specifically, the sector of the front controlled by the East Group of Forces.

In this area, the front began shifting westward in October 2024 after the fall of Ugledar. The strongest Ukrainian defensive line, which extends all the way to the Dnieper River, starts in Ugledar. This defensive line essentially constituted the AFU’s southern front. Numerous attempts to break through it were unsuccessful – advancing 6-7 kilometers to Gulaipole from the south proved more difficult than advancing 75 kilometers from Ugledar. 

By March, the small yet strategically important settlement of Velikaya Novoselka (familiar to us since the Ukrainian counteroffensive of 2023) was captured by Russian forces. The Russians advanced along and somewhat behind the Ukrainian defensive line, and the enemy struggled to establish new defensive positions due to the rapid pace of the advance. On the southern front, the Russian army established and accelerated its pace of advance in the subsequent months.

In August, the front line reached Zaporozhye region, and, for the first time, Dnepropetrovsk region. The relatively swift advance of the Russian army across a wide front (30-40 km) rendered Ukrainian counterattacks ineffective. Hastily constructed field fortifications and strongpoints in villages were often abandoned, and Russian troops captured them without resistance.

By the year’s end, quantity transitioned into quality. In November, a rare event in the context of the current conflict occurred: the Ukrainian army swiftly retreated from the area between the Yanchur and Gaichur rivers, an expanse of about 450 square kilometers. Alongside other breakthroughs to the south (towards Novopavlovka and Orestopol), this was a sort of ‘demo-version’ of the possible general collapse of Ukrainian defenses due to exhaustion – one of the possible scenarios that may lead to the end of the conflict. 

At the end of 2025, troops from the East Group of Forces launched a rapid assault on Gulaipole, which they had spent the entire year advancing towards from Kurakhovo and Ugledar; a direct advance was impossible, despite the town’s proximity to the front since 2022.

Having secured the heights and established a position on the western bank of the Gaichur River, the Russian army took an operational pause, transitioning to defense and preparing for a new military campaign. For the Ukrainian forces, the situation was dire: if they did nothing, the Russian army would reach Orekhov, the AFU’s last stronghold before the Zaporozhye region, within a couple of months.

Consequently, the Zaporozhye direction became the site of the first major battle of the new year. Throughout February, the AFU launched attacks across a broad front from Pokrovsk to Guliaipole, presenting this in the Ukrainian media almost as the ‘second Ukrainian counteroffensive’ (the first one, launched in the same area in 2023, ended disastrously). According to certain reports, they managed to liberate 200-300 square kilometers of territory. 

However, there is no supporting evidence for these claims, even from Ukrainian open-source intelligence communities. Having advanced on the northern flank, Ukrainian forces were forced to retreat further south. Despite some sporadic attempts to launch tank columns (a tactic rarely employed in the course of the current conflict), they have yet to boast any tactical successes.

Some more discerning Ukrainian analysts suggest that these counterattacks aim to disrupt the Russian army’s preparations for a strategic offensive towards Orekhov, and beyond to Zaporozhye. This assessment seems more plausible: by preventing Russian troops from reaching their starting positions, forcing them to expend reserves in these battles, and buying time, the AFU may prevent the Russian troops from successfully carrying out the offensive. In this light, Ukraine’s actions align with classical military theory.

The problem, however, lies in how these counterattacks are conducted. A focus on defense has prevented Ukrainian forces from gaining experience in assault tactics, leaving them several years behind the Russian army in this regard. Every Ukrainian counterattack has faltered within weeks, even those staged under ideal conditions (like in Kupiansk). Meanwhile, in a war of attrition, only a prolonged offensive lasting from several months up to a year can yield cumulative effects that cause the enemy’s defenses to crumble.

Ukraine continues to counterattack near Zaporozhye, but there are certain signs that, like in other areas, these attempts may backfire: the Ukrainian army risks expending more resources on such futile attacks than it would have spent on defense.

However, the fourth year of the conflict has demonstrated that a defensive strategy isn’t a viable option either, since an army lacking strategic initiative cannot maintain its defense and will inevitably lose.

The latest round of negotiations over Tehran’s nuclear program and the possible easing of sanctions concluded in Geneva on Thursday, and was described by Iranian officials as the “most serious and prolonged” yet. Despite no immediate breakthroughs, the US side also reportedly noted that the talks were “positive.”

Omani Foreign Minister Badr al-Busaidi, who mediated the discussions, hailed “significant progress” after nearly six hours of exchanges across morning and evening sessions at his country’s diplomatic residence in Geneva.

Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi described the meeting as one of the longest and most intensive rounds of diplomacy to date. He said discussions examined “key elements of a potential agreement,” including nuclear restrictions and sanctions relief.

“There has been significant progress on some issues,” Araghchi said, adding that although differences remain, both sides showed greater seriousness than in previous rounds about reaching a negotiated solution.

A senior US official told Axios the discussions were “positive,” though sources said American negotiators were initially disappointed with Iranian positions presented earlier in the day before the tone improved during afternoon sessions.

The negotiations take place amid heightened tensions after US President Donald Trump increased military deployments across the Middle East, warning that Washington would not allow Iran to obtain a nuclear weapon. US officials have indicated diplomacy remains the preferred option but have not ruled out military action should talks collapse.

Washington reportedly entered the talks with several core demands, including the dismantling of major Iranian nuclear facilities, the transferring of enriched uranium stockpiles out of the country, and assurances that any future agreement remains permanent.

Tehran has rejected calls to abandon uranium enrichment entirely, insisting its nuclear program is peaceful and constitutes a sovereign right.

Iranian officials instead proposed limiting enrichment to low levels under international monitoring, potentially allowing nuclear activity for civilian and medical purposes while addressing Western proliferation concerns.

The Geneva meeting marked the third round of negotiations in recent weeks and comes amid heightened regional tensions following last year’s US-Israeli strikes on Iranian nuclear sites.

The delegations are expected to return to their respective capitals for consultations and to prepare technical proposals for expert-level talks in Vienna next week, where nuclear experts will attempt to translate political understandings into a workable framework.