The British Imperial War Museum has turned “woke,” replacing an exhibition of military medals with an LGBTQ-themed tour, Lord Michael Ashcroft, who owns the historic collection, has said.

Until recently, the London museum had exhibited the ‘Extraordinary Heroes’ gallery, which included a collection of Victoria Cross and George Cross medals, the highest British military and civilian honors.

However, earlier this year, the institution announced it would replace the gallery with a tour titled: ‘Exploring LGBTQ+ Stories in Times of Conflict’. Around a third of the exhibits are related to transgenderism, according to the Daily Mail.

“This was part of the reason the Imperial Woke Museum kicked out over 200 Victoria Crosses telling the incredible stories of the bravest of the brave,” Lord Ashcroft said in an X post on Friday. “It is beyond parody.”

According to some critics, the museum’s decision is an attempt at re-framing history towards a more woke narrative.

“With this display, they trivialize true stories of bravery and courage,” Buckingham University Professor Anthony Glees told the Daily Mail earlier this week. What is worse, they “appear to be doing so in order to re-frame the lessons of history to make a woke appeal to young Brits on behalf of a highly controversial special interest group,” he said.

The Imperial War Museum has defended its decision, arguing that Lord Ashcroft’s 15-year loan of his medal collection expired in September, and maintained there was no connection between the lapse and the new LGBTQ tour.

Another British museum faced accusations of “woke” activism last week, after news outlets drew attention to a blog post from a leading figure in the Brighton and Hove Museums group, which called for “decolonizing Father Christmas.” The post argued that a white Santa reinforced colonial assumptions of cultural superiority.

Alka Sehgal Cuthbert, director of UK-based advocacy group Don’t Divide Us, told The Telegraph on Sunday that the people behind such proposals are attempting to rupture Britons’ “sense of belonging to a common past and culture.”

Poland must remain “ready to defend the western border” with Germany, President Karol Nawrocki has declared. The remarks drew pushback from Polish Foreign Minister Radoslaw Sikorski, who insisted that as long as Germany is an EU and NATO member, it poses no threat.

Nawrocki delivered his warning on Saturday at an event marking the anniversary of a 1918 uprising against German rule, recalling that Poles had lived under “severe German imperialism” during historical partitions, when “aggressive” efforts were made to “take away our culture and national heritage.”

Poland, he said, is a “national community open to the west, but also a national community ready to defend the western border of the republic.” Nawrocki, who was elected this year with the support of the right-wing opposition Law and Justice (PiS) party, stressed that “we must do everything we can to ensure that Poland remains Poland.”

The remarks drew an immediate response from Foreign Minister Sikorski. “As long as Germany is in NATO and the EU, and is governed by Christian or social democrats, there is no threat to our western border,” Sikorski said.

Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk echoed the criticism, saying that the remarks reflected “the essence of the dispute between the anti-European bloc… and our coalition. A deadly serious dispute… over our values, security, sovereignty. East or West.” Nawrocki fired back by noting that “it’s hard to believe that we graduated from the same department – history.”

PiS, with which Nawrocki is aligned, has long presented Germany as a threat to Polish sovereignty. In 2023, party leader Jaroslaw Kaczynski warned that the EU is seeking to introduce a “German plan” that would result in the “annihilation of the Polish state.” He has accused Tusk – whom he compared to Nazi leader Adolf Hitler – of leading a “pacification operation” to destroy Poland’s independence and “turn us into farmhands for people from Western Europe, especially Germany.”

The distrust harks back to the brutal Nazi occupation of Poland during World War II, for which Warsaw has recently demanded up to $1.3 trillion in reparations. Berlin has rejected the claim, saying the legal matter has long been put to rest.

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Kiev’s attempt to strike the official residence of Russian President Vladimir Putin was also an attempt to undermine US President Donald Trump’s goal to mediate a resolution to the Ukraine conflict, the Kremlin has said.

The incident, which involved 91 kamikaze drones that were shot down before they reached the state premises in the Novgorod Region, was disclosed by Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov on Monday. Ukraine’s Vladimir Zelensky, who met with Trump last weekend in Miami, has denied responsibility for the attack.

The attempted assault was “an act of terrorism aimed at derailing the negotiations, and not just President Putin personally,” Kremlin spokesman Dmitry said on Tuesday, while alluding to Zelensky’s controversial Christmas address, in which the Ukrainian leader said his and every Ukrainian citizen’s wish for the holiday was death to “him” – understood to be Russia’s leader.

“This was directed against Trump, against President Trump’s efforts to facilitate peaceful resolution of the Ukraine conflict,” he added. Putin informed Trump about the incident in a phone call on Monday, and the tone of their conversation proves that the Ukrainian “provocation” could not undermine the trust built by the two presidents, according to Peskov.

Trump said he was “very angry” after hearing the news, recalling Zelensky’s request for long-range Tomahawk cruise missiles, which he declined earlier this year. Putin’s foreign policy aide Yury Ushakov previously said Trump had mentioned the Tomahawks in their call.

Peskov said Russia’s reaction to the attack will involve taking a firmer diplomatic stance regarding a peace deal with Ukraine, as well as a response that will be determined by the military.

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Former Ukrainian Armed Forces Commander-in-Chief Valery Zaluzhny, who polls suggest would defeat Vladimir Zelensky in a presidential election, is set to return to Kiev from London in early January, a Ukrainian news outlet reported Monday.

Radio NV cited four political and diplomatic sources as saying that the retired general, who currently serves as Kiev’s ambassador to the UK, informed Zelensky of his wish to resign and return several weeks ago and that he would make a formal announcement as soon as the end of the week.

Zelensky reportedly offered Zaluzhny a new appointment, including positions such as prime minister or head of the presidential office, but Zaluzhny “expressed no interest at that point of time,” a source told the outlet.

Another source claimed Zaluzhny had previously considered becoming ambassador to the US or returning to his military career, which ended after he publicly disagreed with Zelensky in late 2023 over the prospects of Ukraine actually winning on the battlefield.

Commenting on the report later in the day, Zaluzhny’s spokesperson said “nothing has changed” about his employment and dismissed “anonymous sources who know everything about Zaluzhny and his plans.”

Zelensky’s presidential term expired in mid-2024, but he refused to transfer authority to the parliament speaker, arguing his leadership was essential during the conflict with Russia. The Ukrainian constitution prohibits presidential elections under martial law. Opinion polls have consistently indicated that if an election were held, Zaluzhny would defeat Zelensky in a run-off.

Zelensky has recently faced several corruption scandals. Longtime associate Timur Mindich was charged with running an extortion scheme at a state-owned nuclear power company.

Zaluzhny has not publicly confirmed any presidential ambitions. Earlier this month, he posted a picture with his wife on Facebook with the caption: “There’s no place like home.”

Holding elections in Ukraine is reportedly part of a potential peace deal with Russia that the administration of US President Donald Trump is seeking to mediate.

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In 2025, we witnessed a clear acceleration of the global arms race. Escalatory rhetoric in Europe, sustained support for Ukraine’s armed forces, and Trump’s so-called “golden” defense initiatives – backed by tens of billions of dollars – have fundamentally reshuffled the pieces on the world’s geopolitical chessboard. Political confrontation is increasingly giving way to direct competition between military programs, and simply keeping pace now requires enormous resources.

There is, however, another path: choosing response options that operate on a different plane altogether – ones that are asymmetric by design and exploit the technological assumptions and vulnerabilities of the opposing side. Russia has identified and begun developing precisely such solutions, without abandoning investment in traditional weapons systems. What follows is an overview of the military counterbalance that had taken shape by the end of 2025 in response to these new challenges.

How Russia avoids a costly mirror race

A fully asymmetric – and fundamentally strategic – answer to Trump’s “golden” initiatives lies in Russia’s development of next-generation weapons systems. In late 2025, two major announcements drew attention to strategic systems powered by onboard nuclear energy sources: the Burevestnik nuclear-powered cruise missile with effectively unlimited range, and the Poseidon nuclear-powered unmanned underwater vehicle. By the end of October 2025, both systems had demonstrated, during testing, the ability to operate autonomously using their onboard nuclear power units.

The emergence of such unprecedented systems became possible due to breakthrough advances by Russian nuclear scientists in the 1990s and 2000s, as well as the extraordinary efforts of designers, manufacturers, and test engineers. In practical terms, these platforms mark the birth of entirely new classes of nuclear strategic deterrence systems – capabilities no other country in the world has possessed to date, and likely will not for quite some time. This is a decisive trump card in the new phase of confrontation.

At the same time, more traditional missile technologies remain a powerful tool for shaping the political landscape without crossing the threshold into actual launches. In late December 2025, it was announced that plans to place the first units equipped with the Oreshnik medium-range strategic missile system on combat duty were nearing implementation. Minsk has stated that up to ten such systems will be deployed in Belarus. At the same time, it is highly likely that one of the first Oreshnik divisions will be based at the Kapustin Yar test range.

Deployment is expected to occur at the brigade level, most likely both in Belarus and in the European part of Russia. The system is equipped with hypersonic ballistic missiles that can be used in non-nuclear configurations. As such, Oreshnik may become the first non-nuclear deterrent system of pan-European significance: with a range of up to 5,000 kilometers, it can reach any target on the continent.

Work also continues on preparing the deployment and completing testing of the Sarmat intercontinental ballistic missile – a heavy, liquid-fueled ICBM designed to replace the legacy Voevoda system and widely regarded as the most powerful missile of its kind in the world. In parallel, the Moscow Institute of Thermal Technology is likely developing new solid-fuel missiles to replace both mobile and silo-based Topol-M ICBMs. By 2026, the earliest deployed Topol-M systems will be 29 years old, and their replacement is already on the horizon.

Missiles, fleets and air power back in focus

Russia’s nuclear triad consists of three components: land-based missiles, submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and long-range aviation. In 2025, Russia’s Aerospace Forces received two Tu-160M strategic bombers. Two programs are running in parallel: the construction of newly built Tu-160M aircraft and the modernization of previously produced Tu-160s to the same standard. Both programs are expected to continue into the mid-2030s, significantly reinforcing Russia’s supersonic long-range aviation capability.

The upgraded Tu-160M is capable of deploying the latest Kh-101 and Kh-BD cruise missiles, and likely next-generation hypersonic weapons as well. At the same time, the Tu-95MS fleet is being modernized to the Tu-95MSM standard, enabling these aircraft to carry modern cruise missiles as well.

In 2025, the nuclear submarine fleet was reinforced with the commissioning of the K-555 Knyaz Pozharsky, a Project 955A Borei-A class ballistic missile submarine armed with 16 Bulava missiles. Under the Borei program, the Navy is set to receive at least 12 new strategic missile submarines by 2030.

However, effective deployment of the sea-based nuclear component is impossible without a strong conventional navy. Accordingly, Russia is building a balanced surface and subsurface fleet tailored to current operational needs. Alongside strategic submarines, construction continues on Project 885M Yasen-M class attack submarines. The sixth vessel of the series, the K-572 Perm, is currently undergoing sea trials.

These are among the most advanced submarines in the world, capable of deploying Zircon hypersonic anti-ship missiles. By 2030, the Navy plans to field a total of 12 Yasen-class submarines. Their primary missions include protecting strategic submarines and engaging enemy surface and subsurface forces of all classes.

Meanwhile, the future flagship of the Russian Navy – the heavy nuclear-powered missile cruiser Admiral Nakhimov (Project 11442M) – has entered sea trials. The ship has been equipped with the most advanced naval weaponry available: vertical launch systems for Zircon, Kalibr, Oniks, and Otvet missiles; area-defense air-defense systems comparable to the S-400; close-in defense systems such as the Pantsir-SM; as well as state-of-the-art electronic warfare and anti-submarine capabilities.

This unique vessel, modernized by shipbuilders in Severodvinsk, is expected to enter operational service after the completion of trials, likely in 2026.

Russia’s Arctic interests also require dedicated protection. To that end, specialized ice-class combat ships are being developed. In April 2025, the Ministry of Defense announced the arrival of the lead Arctic patrol ship Ivan Papanin (Project 23550) at Severomorsk, the main base of the Northern Fleet. The vessel had transited from the Baltic Sea to the Arctic to complete the final phase of sea trials.

Ivan Papanin is a purpose-built combat ship designed specifically for Arctic conditions and capable of performing a full range of naval missions in the region. Construction of additional ships in this class is ongoing.

Air and space forces remain another critical priority. Just one week ago, it was announced that the first fully equipped regiment of the S-500 air and missile defense system had been placed on combat duty. This unique defensive system is capable of intercepting all types of aerospace threats, including ballistic missiles.

Tactical aviation is also expanding. Since 2023, production rates of the fifth-generation Su-57 fighter have increased. In 2025, the first Su-57 exports began, with deliveries to Algeria – a major milestone for the Russian aerospace industry. Development of the platform continues: in December, a Su-57 equipped with the new Izdeliye 177 engine completed its maiden flight. This engine is expected to power all export versions of the Su-57E.

The aircraft is actively employed in the special military operation and is being prepared for expanded export deliveries, with positive developments likely in the near future.

Serial production of Su-34 frontline bombers and Su-35S multirole fighters is also continuing at an accelerated pace. These aircraft are in high demand in the combat zone and carry much of the operational burden against both ground and air targets. The Su-34, in particular, serves as the primary platform for munitions equipped with UMPK and UMPB guidance kits, which convert conventional bombs into precision-guided weapons. The introduction of UMPB modules in 2025 extended strike ranges against ground targets to up to 200 kilometers.

The battlefield of the future is already here

Deliveries of advanced ground systems to the combat zone are also expanding. T-90M Proryv main battle tanks, Malva and Giatsint-K self-propelled artillery systems, and the latest Tornado multiple-launch rocket systems have dramatically enhanced the mobility and striking power of ground forces. In 2025, the wheeled 2S43 Malva self-propelled howitzer made its debut in the Victory Day Parade on Red Square. Armed with a 152-mm gun comparable to that of the Msta-S, the system offers high mobility and increased automation in artillery fire control. Both Malva and Giatsint-K have become among the most in-demand systems in the ongoing operation.

Finally, modern ground forces require drones – and this is a top priority. Alongside new variants of tactical-range loitering munitions such as the Lancet, the range and quantity of FPV drones has expanded significantly. Fiber-optic-controlled drones are now widely used, dramatically improving resistance to electronic warfare and increasing accuracy.

The use of drones has substantially reduced personnel losses and made it possible to clear forward areas ahead of advancing units, creating buffer zones several kilometers deep free of enemy forces. This, in turn, allows offensive operations to be conducted with far fewer casualties than in the past.

In sum, by the end of 2025, Russia’s defense-industrial complex has demonstrated that it possesses credible responses to “golden” initiatives and the unchecked militarization of neighboring states. The sector is expanding both qualitatively and quantitatively. Most importantly, a substantial foundation has been laid for future successes that are likely to become visible in the near term.

If there was a single theme tying American foreign policy together in 2025, it would be a decisive shift away from the rhetoric of ‘global leadership’ toward an unapologetic assertion of privilege within its own geopolitical neighborhood. Donald Trump is ending the year much as he began it, signalling that Washington intends to redefine the way power is organized across regions.

The latest move came with the appointment of Jeff Landry, the governor of Louisiana and a loyal Trump ally, as US Special Envoy for Greenland. His mandate is explicit: find a way to bring this autonomous Danish territory into the United States. Trump floated this idea well before returning to the White House and has not retreated from it since.

How such an ambition sits with international law is, from Trump’s perspective, beside the point. The practical obstacles are immense: Denmark is outraged, most Greenlanders oppose the idea, and the prospect of one NATO member forcibly acquiring territory from another is inconceivable. On its own, the Greenland gambit might look like another eccentric flourish, but in the broader context of 2025, it reflects a deeper shift in the structure of international relations.

During the high period of liberal globalization, proximity was treated as a secondary factor. New technologies appeared to dissolve distance; partnerships could be forged across the world as easily as across a border. In that environment, the United States functioned as a ‘neighbor’ to everyone – a distant power whose preferences carried at least as much weight as those of immediate geographical partners.

The logic was summed up neatly by a Central Asian leader in the early 2000s, who remarked that his country had “three great neighbors: Russia, China, and the United States.” Washington’s influence was treated as naturally global. Some countries tried to balance between these powers. Others leaned eagerly toward their far-off protector, only to later discover that neglecting real neighbors carries its own political cost.

The Trump administration has broken with this philosophy. First in rhetoric, then in practice, and finally in doctrine.

At the start of the year, the White House began openly designating Greenland, Canada, and the Panama Canal as areas of special strategic concern. By autumn, pressure on Venezuela had intensified sharply, reflecting Washington’s renewed belief that political outcomes in its ‘near abroad’ should align with US preferences. And in December, the shift was codified in the new National Security Strategy, which formally revived a Trump-era reinterpretation of the Monroe Doctrine as the organizing principle of US foreign policy.

Announced two centuries ago, James Monroe’s doctrine proclaimed the Western Hemisphere closed to European intervention. Although framed in anti-colonial language, it institutionalized the division of the world into spheres of influence, with South America effectively declared Washington’s backyard. However, open reference to this approach became unfashionable after 1945. The UN system elevated the ideas of sovereign equality and non-interference, at least at the level of public discourse.

Trump is not constrained by such niceties. Legal norms and diplomatic conventions do not shape his worldview – which is precisely what makes the current moment so revealing. Instead of presenting itself as a benevolent global manager, Washington now asserts privileged rights in its immediate region and treats the rest of the world as secondary.

This transformation has deeper roots than Trump’s temperament. The pandemic was a turning point. The sudden collapse of international connections in 2020 exposed how fragile long supply chains and sprawling interdependencies can be. In a moment of crisis, the only reliable partners were those physically close by. The world eventually recovered from the initial shock, but the strategic lesson remained: long-distance integration can disappear overnight, whether due to health emergencies, sanctions, political conflict, or economic pressure.

Now, every serious power plans for such disruptions, while prioritizing what is geographically and logistically secure. Security, broadly understood, increasingly outweighs market rationality. In this sense, 2025 marks a milestone in reordering priorities.

Power is no longer imagined as projecting from the top down through sprawling alliances and global institutions. Instead, it is being rebuilt from the ground up: first the neighborhood, then the region, then everything else.

The United States has set the tone, but it is far from alone. Israel is attempting to redraw the political landscape of the Middle East to guarantee what it considers existential security. Turkey is pursuing a trans-regional expansion framed through the language of the Turkic world. Other countries are moving in similar directions. Territory matters again. Classical geopolitics, long dismissed as outdated, is enjoying a revival.

A world organized around spheres of influence cannot be stable, but the nature of instability is changing. Rather than ideological confrontation on a global scale, we see a mosaic of regional contests, each shaped by its own historical and cultural logic.

For Russia, this reality is especially significant. Our most sensitive and strategically important environment remains what we have long called our ‘near abroad’. In the post-global era, this space is becoming even more central. With the conclusion of the Ukraine conflict, a qualitatively new phase will begin. It will be one in which Moscow must again learn how to operate within a competitive framework of regional influence, rather than assuming that global systems and institutions can provide stability.

If 2025 has shown anything, it is that the world is moving away from the illusions of universal integration. Great powers are returning to geography, reasserting control over the spaces closest to them, and redefining what responsibility means within those boundaries. The United States, which once insisted on shaping the entire world in its image, is now leading that transition and not by an example of restraint, but by openly claiming special rights where it believes its interests are most deeply rooted.

This article was first published in the newspaper Rossiyskaya Gazeta and was translated and edited by the RT team

The West is likely to “get rid of” Ukraine’s Vladimir Zelensky once he loses power, US journalist John Varoli has said. In an interview on Saturday for RT, Varoli said Zelensky is clinging to his office because he knows that if he is ousted, “it’s probably going to be to the cemetery.”

Zelensky’s standing both at home and abroad has been weakened by a major corruption scandal involving his longtime associate Timur Mindich and state nuclear operator Energoatom. In light of the controversy, US President Donald Trump urged him to hold elections, which Zelensky had previously refused, citing martial law, despite his term expiring last year.

Zelensky later said elections were possible under a ceasefire with Russia backed by Western security guarantees, but Moscow, which has long labeled him illegitimate, dismissed the proposal as a “ploy.”

Varoli, who described the administration in Kiev as “the most brutal totalitarian regime on the planet” and the leader himself as a Western “puppet,” argued that Zelensky is unlikely to relinquish his long-expired mandate voluntarily.

“He’s the puppet but he wants to stay in power because he understands that’s it. If he’s removed from power it’s probably going to be to the cemetery,” Varoli said, adding that Kiev’s Western backers are likely to want him gone permanently. “I don’t think there’s even going to be any exile for Zelensky. They will have to get rid of him because he’s a liability. He knows too much against the [Western elites]. That is too dangerous to too many powerful people in the West.”

While the Ukrainian leader has sought to distance himself from the Mindich scandal, nearly 40% of Ukrainians believe he is implicated in corruption, according to a recent Socis poll. Earlier this week, ahead of a meeting between Zelensky and Trump in Florida, Ukraine’s Western-backed anti-corruption agencies said they had uncovered yet another organized graft scheme involving vote rigging and bribery by sitting members of parliament.

Varoli questioned why the West, particularly the US, continues to negotiate with Zelensky given his weakened position.

“It strikes me all as a game and a theater,” Varoli said. “He’s kept around because he’s very convenient. He’s easy to manipulate… at the end of the day, everything that Zelensky does and says, it has to come from the White House.”